A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, October 22, 2017
Can CBK revive the 2015 common front to save yahapalanaya from electoral wreckage in 2018?
Chandrika Kumaratunga
By all accounts the much delayed local government elections will likely
be held in January 2018. It will be a couple of weeks after January 8,
the day SWRD Bandaranaike was born and the day Mahinda Rajapaksa was
defeated – with the long century of Lanka’s modern history in between.
In all likelihood, the elections for 335 local bodies – stretching from
the power-hub of Colombo to the smallest drought-stricken Pradeshiya
Sabha, will be seen as a national referendum. Except for the President
and the Prime Minister who, after apparently planning on a
constitutional referendum before the local elections in which they would
have been on the same side, are now getting ready to fight it out
between their two national-unity parties (the UNP and the SLFP) and the
new third-party of the Rajapaksas (the SLPP). It is not going to be a
dramatic high-noon shootout between the good, the bad and the ugly. It
would instead be an ugly brawl among the bad, the worse and the worst –
depending on which side you are on, that will leave everyone wounded,
with some more than the others. And the body politic – to recall a
grandiloquent phrase from the 1950s parliament – will lie prostrate in
electoral debris.
The President’s SLFP has got off to a sputtering start. By some method
or madness the party went on a purging and filling spree involving 50
SLFP district offices. Obviously, President Sirisena’s left hand and his
right hand did not know what each other were doing. With one hand, the
President appointed Chandrika Kumaratunga as SLFP organizer for
Attanagalla, and with the other he picked a notorious Provincial Council
sexist bully and convict as the former President’s counterpart for
Anamaduwa. Hopefully, the latter blunder will not last long, if it has
not been rescinded already. Either way, it is not going to bring in a
good harvest of votes either in the January local government elections,
or later in the staggered Provincial Council elections.
A politically significant outcome of the President’s actions, however,
is the ushering in of Chandrika Kumaratunga to the electoral fray, as
the SLFP organizer for the Attanagalla electoral district and the larger
Gampaha District, and with that the potential for the former President
to reactivate the old Troika of herself, President Sirisena and Prime
Minister Wickremasinghe. The ‘hope’, I am suggesting here is premised on
the assumption that together the three of them have a better chance of
thinking and acting politically wisely, than when they are left to their
individual resources and compulsions. There is no guarantee that Ms.
Kumaratunga will try to or succeed in reactivating the troika, and that
the three will act wisely, but what can be guaranteed is that without
the troika getting together and acting collectively wisely, the
Sirisena-Wickremasinghe government is on a fast track to foundering,
electorally and otherwise.
Take the electoral arithmetic or algebra, not to mention the electoral
vectors. In the 2015 January Presidential election, Ms. Kumaratunga went
flat out to make sure that Attanagalla and Gampaha both registered a
majority vote for the Common Opposition candidate, the current
President, and against her nemesis successor, Mahinda Rajapaksa. She
managed a small majority in Gampaha, but it was still a big victory
after what the Rajapaksas had been doing for ten years to usurp the
political estate of the Bandaranaikes. But the small majority that
Kumaratunga worked hard to win for the Common Opposition candidate was
largely made possible by UNP votes. Take the UNP votes out of the
equation, and where will the President’s SLFP stand in the upcoming
local and provincial elections – not only in Attanagalla and Gampaha but
also nationally, in seven of the nine provinces excluding the Northern
and Eastern Provinces?
As for the UNP, it must not count its chickens before even the eggs have
been collected for hatching. The UNP’s calculation that it could come
up the middle, with the SLFP vote divided between the President’s SLFP
and the Rajapaksa SLPP, is just calculation and not proof it has victory
in the bag. The more likely scenario is a smorgasbord of an electoral
map with control of local bodies in seven provinces distributed among
all three parties, their alliances, and even the JVP. In the North,
there will be local arm-wrestling between the TNA and its detractors – a
Tamil referendum writ small. The East - the provincial microcosm of
national plurality - will be a three-way split (not quite 50-50) between
the Muslims, the Sinhalese and the Tamils – going by the alphabetical
order in neutral English. Provincial elections will invariably lead to
different coalitions in different provinces. Electoral entropy
(disorder) will be released nationally, thanks in no small measure due
to the prevailing constitutional interpretation that rather mistakenly
renders the exercise of the franchise - coeval, coequal and
co-extensive, at the national, provincial and local levels.
Even if the UNP alliance were to secure the largest number of local
government councils, it will be a Pyrrhic victory at best. At worst, it
would be a disaster for the ‘national-unity’ government in Colombo and
whatever positive energy it still has left in its tank before it runs
out of its term in Colombo. How can the President and the Prime Minister
and all the Ministers in the grand cabinet drawn from their two parties
cohabit in the government in Colombo for another two years after
proxy-fighting in the local elections in January 2018 and Provincial
Council elections thereafter? How can they, after tearing themselves
apart throughout the country in the local/provincial elections, present a
united front in a constitutional referendum before the same voters?
Wouldn’t that be the height of political, and even constitutional,
cynicism? And what role, if any, can Chandrika Kumaratunga play in the
unfolding disorder of elections?
Saving yahapalanaya by ‘devolving’ it
There is a necessary and legitimate question to be asked first. Could
the Sirisena-Wickremasinghe government be saved at all, or does it even
deserve to be saved? The inveterate school of CBK detractors will raise
the corollary question as to whether she can save anyone from anything.
The prima facie answer to the first double-question is – the government
could be saved, but it does not at all deserve to be saved. Not after
all the full-serial exposes from the ongoing Central Bank bond scam
inquiry. Not after the government’s parliamentary chicanery of passing
laws by abusing the committee process. And not after a government
minister insists that no one should question the legitimacy of tender
awards in his ministry because he is incorruptible owing to his large
bank balance and the tens of thousands acres of land his and his wife’s
grandparents owned by divine blessing, or had come into possession of
through human (mis)appropriation. In other words, a government of
superrich ministers must invariably be considered super-clean. This is
not evidence of ministerial smartness but manifestation of
open-mouth-idiocy (OMI).
If the government does not deserve to be saved, why should it be saved
at all? It is because the alternatives are worse – especially when the
choice is between throwing out the lesser rascals and letting back the
bigger rascals. Equally, the present government, given its two-party
structure, is more vulnerable to public pressure between elections than
the family-monolithic Rajapaksas ever were, or would be, if they were to
return to power. The Rajapaksas have shown no intention of changing but
only the calculated readiness to cash in on the copycat blunders of the
present government. On the other hand, the ongoing Commission of
Inquiry into Central Bank bond scam is clear evidence of the
government’s vulnerability to pressure. There should be more of them for
the government’s own good.
To ‘save’ the present government at the local and provincial elections
is to subject the government to even greater public pressure. The first
indication of successful pressurising would be the government
replicating the 2015 ‘common opposition’ strategy in the 2018 local and
provincial elections by launching a common platform and fielding a slate
of ‘common government’ candidates rather than UNP and SLFP candidates.
The second indication of success would be to force the government
leaders to field ‘clean candidates’ and avoid corrupt and deadwood
candidates.
Put another way, a potential strategy is to carry over the yahapalanaya
movement and momentum that emerged in the January 2015 presidential
election to the 2018 local and provincial elections. In the current
contentions over terminology, you might even say yahapalanaya could be
saved only by devolving it. The intended direction of intervention is
appropriate because the yahapalanaya movement arose from the people and
their organizations quite spontaneously and quite independent of the
political calculations surrounding the dramatic emergence of Maithripala
Sirisena as the common opposition candidate to challenge the incumbent
president. That movement arose because the people were disgusted with
the Rajapaksa government and wanted it gone.
There has been plenty of theorizing that Maithripala Sirisena would
never have left the Rajapaksa government if he had been made Prime
Minister by President Rajapaksa. That theory misses the point that if it
was not Maithripala Sirisena who defected, it would have been someone
else. It misses even the greater point Pieter Keuneman made in 1952,
speaking dialectically during the vote of condolence to Sri Lanka’s
first Prime Minister, that the measure of politics is not in the
subjective intentions of political actors but in the objective results
that flow from their political actions. Objectively, therefore, in 2015
the common candidacy of Maithripala Sirisena came into confluence with
the common urge of the people for a change not just in government but
for changes in the ways of the government. The ways of government badly
in need of change are at the local and provincial levels, as much as
they are at the national level.
The new government, for reasons well known, has not changed its ways.
But the yahapalanaya movement is still unfinished business. But it does
not have the luxury of choosing from a range of politically promising
alternatives. It has to work with the same old bandicoot within the
country’s constitutional and electoral constraints. The thrust of my
argument is that people interested in changing the ways of government
could use the upcoming local government elections to save the present
government in spite of itself, by reviving the old momentum of 2015 for
good governance with renewed commitments by government leaders.
Chandrika Kumaratunga is the acknowledged architect of the coup that
precipitated the common opposition candidate in 2015. Now she has the
opportunity to play a more open but catalytic role in launching a common
platform for the government parties to contest the local and even the
provincial elections. The logistics of working that out is for the party
operatives to figure out. The alternative is collective shipwreck.